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One of the first principles of capitalism is, undeniably, instrumentalisation; the subjection of 
one thing to another with the speculative aim of producing some future ‘value’, regardless of 
how dubious – or even noxious this ‘value’ may be. In the knowledge economy, which produces 
value from accelerated innovation (also interpretable as the overproduction of the minimally 
different) value is extracted in two chief ways: via the misplaced rhetoric of excellence, and 
via netocratic quantification. Both of these processes are further aggravated by the additive 
nature of the digital media (Han); the irrationality of rationality (Ritzer); and attention deficit. 
Despite the fact that knowledge in general, and artistic knowledge in particular, is heterogeneous 
as well as, essentially, undecidable, in this essay I argue for a specific brand of knowledge: 
idiosyncratic, and, if need be, incomprehensible. Not as a weak ‘I would rather not’ strategy 
of resistance – to borrow from Herman Melville’s over-exploited, half-dead anti-hero Bartleby 
– but as an antidote to reductionism, information deluge, and their increasing neurological 
consequences, such as Information Fatigue Syndrome. 
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La idiosincrasia como estrategia en la era de la Violencia Epistémica
Resumen
Uno de los primeros principios del capitalismo es, indudablemente, la instrumentalización, 
la sujeción de una cosa a otra con el objetivo especulativo de producir algún «valor» futuro, 
independientemente de lo dudoso o incluso nocivo que pueda ser ese «valor». En la economía del 
conocimiento, que produce valor a partir de la innovación acelerada (también interpretable como 
la sobreproducción de lo mínimamente diferente), el valor se extrae de dos formas principales: 
a través de la inapropiada retórica de la excelencia y de la cuantificación netocrática. Ambos 
procesos se ven agravados además por la naturaleza aditiva de los medios digitales (Han), 
por la irracionalidad de la racionalidad (Ritzer) y por el déficit de atención. A pesar de que el 
conocimiento, en general, y el conocimiento artístico, en particular, es heterogéneo, además 
de básicamente indeterminable, en este ensayo abogo por un tipo específico de conocimiento: 
una producción idiosincrática, y, si es preciso, incomprensible. No como una débil estrategia de 
resistencia tipo «preferiría no hacerlo» tomada del antihéroe sobreexplotado y medio muerto 
de Herman Melville, Bartleby, sino como un antídoto frente al reduccionismo, a la inundación 
de información y a sus crecientes consecuencias neurológicas, como el síndrome de fatiga 
informativa. 
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Mediated Immediacy
In Zen Buddhism, there are two ways of entering what is usually 
referred to as the state of ultimate knowledge: via principle and via 
practice. Entrance into knowledge via principle is called subitism. It 
refers to sudden, unmediated understanding. Entrance into knowledge 
via practice is called gradualism and refers to gradual, mediated 
understanding. The two forms of knowledge are not mutually 
exclusive, however. On the contrary, they are interdependent. Their 
interdependence is explained by the parallel existence of two truths: 
the ultimate and the conventional. The ultimate truth collapses the 
difference between the so-called ‘everyday’ and ‘ultimate’ knowledge. 
It claims that ‘even though we make fine distinctions between shallow 
and profound […] the provisional and the ultimate are universally 
coextensive’ (Faure, 1991, p. 33).  Conventional truth, on the other 
hand, makes a clear difference between ‘the metaphorical structure 
of subitism’ and the ‘metonymic structure of gradualism’ (p. 32). It 
claims that ascension to ultimate knowledge cannot occur without a 
clear method and a sustained practice. The two truths, and the two 
forms of knowledge, operate somewhat like Rubin’s vase. Created 
in 1915 by Danish psychologist Edgar Rubin, the ambiguous image 
of a vase, which is simultaneously an image of two human profiles 
facing each other, presents the viewer with two undecidable shape 
interpretations. Both are consistent with the retinal image but only 
one interpretation can be maintained at any given time. Despite the 
fact that we know that there are two images we can only see one at a 
time. At the same time, however, we know that the ‘two’ images are, 
in fact, the foreground and the background of a single image, which 
creates the illusion of two different images. In Zen, the two truths 
oscillate in similar fashion, simultaneously collapsing and upholding 
the hierarchies of knowledge. In the pages that follow, I examine the 
oscillation of two (seemingly) different approaches to artistic research, 
as embedded in the wider context of cognitive-capitalist knowledge 
production, which consists of the exploitative value extraction via the 
misplaced rhetoric of excellence and of netocratic quantification. As 
both processes are aggravated by the additive nature of the digital 
media (Han), the McDonaldised irrationality of rationality (Ritzer), 
and the growing attention deficit, all of which reduce knowledge 
to increasingly simpler bytes of information to be consumed with 
less and less effort, I argue for an idiosyncratic, and, if need be, 
entirely incomprehensible brand of knowledge as the only possible 
exit strategy from the enclosure that cognitive capitalism has created. 
Mediated Immediacy in the Artistic  
and Cultural Realms
Art has traditionally both established and demolished norms and 
epistemic territories, albeit mostly in consecutive, rather than in 
simultaneous ways. Throughout history, it has variously performed 
mimetic, religious, cathartic, philosophical, political, activist, and 
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ecological functions. It has both ‘spoken’ from a number of fixed 
media – architecture, sculpture, painting, music, dance, theatre, film 
– and created cross-disciplinary approaches to knowledge production. 
Among the many examples are Joseph Beuys’s social sculpture, 
in which the social is both the site and the medium of production, 
Nam June Paik and Takako Saito’s intermedial work that embroils 
sensorial compartmentalisations, the telematic work of Paul Sermon, 
or the more recent projects of etoy and SymbioticA, where activism 
meets astrophysics, and where design meets the bio-engineering of 
semi-living organisms, respectively. 
In recent decades, more precisely since the European, UK and US 
universities started introducing art degrees into their undergraduate 
and postgraduate curricula, in the late 1970s and 1980s, there 
has been a problem of the ruling view. Is art a discipline – or an 
agglomeration of disciplines – that grants a method-less, subitist 
entrance into knowledge by creating uniqueness vis-à-vis multiplicity? 
Or, is art a discipline like any other that offers a mediated entrance 
into knowledge by way of a cumulative method comparable to the 
above-mentioned gradualist approach? Christopher Frayling (1993) 
was the first to map out artistic epistemic practices as a relationship 
between searching and result. Apart from historical and theoretical 
research into artistic practices – traditionally carried out by specialists 
who are themselves not art practitioners – Frayling proposed a 
differentiation between two categories. The first is research through 
art and design, in which the artist’s idiosyncratic explorations are 
the only form of research, and where the artwork is the only result. 
The second is research for art and design, which requires an explicit, 
non-idiosyncratic method that relies on contextual, historical, and 
theoretical clarification, in addition to reflection on action, which, 
as Donald Schön (1984) has argued, lies at the core of all reflective 
practice, be it art, design, engineering, or the medical sciences.
The latter category – research for art and design – was further 
elaborated by Chris Rust (2007) who suggested that artistic research 
should, first, define the subject of enquiry as well as explain the 
researcher’s motivation; second, demonstrate an understanding 
of the context of the investigation; third, use a clear methodology; 
and, fourth, articulate the premises of the work in a transparent 
way (2007, p. 75). Rust’s emphasis is, of course, on the difference 
between exploration – as a general, open-ended process that does 
not necessarily follow a particular method – and research that utilises 
a clear as well, importantly, epistemically ratified methodology, both 
as an operational tool for gathering and processing data, and as a 
rationale for its own existence. Although exploration is an integral 
part of all research, regardless of discipline or medium, accountable 
research is quite different; it is a teleological effort at legitimising 
knowledge, which, as Edward Said (2000) has noted in reference to 
Michel Foucault’s comprehensive work in this area, seeks to establish 
a hegemonic relation between ‘order’, ‘authority’ and ‘the regulatory 
power of knowledge’ (2000, p. 239). 
It goes without saying that there can be no ‘either-or’ separation 
of the different practices in artistic research, in production and 
reception alike, much like there can be no separation of the different 
species of knowledge – the sudden and the gradual, the ultimate and 
the conventional. Important to note when discussing subitism and 
gradualism is the fact that, in monastic orders, sudden ascension 
to knowledge is regularly followed by sustained practice while it 
can never be proven with a 100 % certainty that a practitioner’s 
epistemic breakthrough was not produced by an entirely random 
occurrence, despite, rather than because of their sustained practice 
and meditation. 
 After all, the difference between the supposedly ‘unmediated’, 
idiosyncratic, and the ‘mediated’, transparent knowledge, or the 
difference between the metaphoric and the metonymic structure 
of knowledge, is cultural, one could even say macrobiotic. It is also 
political. Many regions with a predominantly Catholic heritage use 
what may be described as ‘direct communication’. In the case of food, 
this may refer to appreciating the host’s delicious cooking by eating a 
lot, smacking one’s lips, licking one’s fingers, grunting, and generally 
producing onomatopoeic sounds of gustatory gratification. In the case 
of a medical examination, it may refer to the medical professional’s 
embodied care, evident in the way they handle the patient, rather than 
in what they say – a reassuring sentence that ‘declares’ care. But the 
condition of possibility of such ‘direct’ gestural, vocal, tactile, or other 
sensorial communication – as opposed to its verbal variant – comes 
from the heritage of mediation in the form of confession and the figure 
of the priest, the historical mediator between the believer and her god. 
A comprehensive discussion of the differences between Catholicism 
and Protestantism is beyond the scope of this essay, however, suffice 
it to say that the chief difference between the two lies in (the concept 
and practice of) mediation. 
In Catholicism, which relies on the notion of salvation via the 
church, the pope is regarded as the infallible stand-in for Jesus, saints 
are prayed to, and the authority to interpret the Bible is placed with the 
church alone. In Protestantism, by contrast, where salvation occurs 
via divine grace, there is no head of the church, as it is thought that 
no one can head the church but Jesus, saints are acknowledged but 
not prayed to, and every believer has the authority to interpret the 
Bible, precisely because there is no mediation between the believer 
and her god (MacCulloch 2003, p. 2-4). Over the centuries, this has 
sedimented as a social ethic (Arruñada 2010, p. 891), and is the reason 
why, in many predominantly Protestant regions, much importance 
is attached to the clarity of (verbal) communication. As there is no 
mediator, the believer is responsible for making herself transparent 
to her god, and this ‘transparency’ is present in all spheres of life. In 
the Netherlands, it is customary to answer the phone – landline as 
well as the mobile phone – by clearly announcing one’s name so that 
the caller knows right away whom they are talking to, regardless of 
the fact that it will, most likely, be Jan who answers Jan’s mobile 
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phone, not Dirk, or Harry. Likewise, it is customary to indicate that 
one is following one’s interlocutor’s drift by adding ‘is duidelijk’, which 
means ‘it is clear’, to the more usual forms of affirmation, such as 
nodding.1 However, such transparency operates with an internalised 
norm, which presupposes a degree of uniformity, and depends on 
prior mediation.
A similar difference between ‘immediacy’ and ‘mediated-ness’ 
is present in views on artistic research. For the most part, it is the 
countries with a Catholic heritage that promote the model of art as 
epistemic advancement in and of its own right, as even a cursory 
glance at the Italian and French (university) art departments will 
reveal. In countries like Denmark, England, the Netherlands, and 
Norway it is often the explanatory, ‘reflection on action’ model that 
is favoured, although this is by no means a fast rule, nor is this the 
only reason for the difference between the two approaches. The other 
reason is political. Since the 1960s artists have increasingly taken 
all segments of art production – curating, theorising, organisation, 
selling and distribution – into their own hands, mostly as a form of 
protest against mediation by the ‘ratified’ epistemic or commercial 
echelons – the curator, the theorist, the critic – who have traditionally 
conferred worth, relevance, and status on a work of art. Examples 
here vary from the 1960s’ Fluxus artists’ appropriation of non-
establishment venues, the street and the artist’s home, and the use 
of such distribution systems as Fluxshops and Mail Order Centers,2 
to the Young British Art’s 1990s DIY-ism that saw artists like Damien 
Hirst, Tracey Emin, and Rachael Whiteread organising warehouse 
shows and writing about their work. Aside from these emancipatory 
gestures, there are also many other good reasons for working with 
the idiosyncratic, non-discursive method on the one hand, and the 
transparent, discursive method on the other, as can be seen from a 
comparative glance at Paul McCarthy’s and Joe Davis’s work. 
Both artists have worked in the ‘in-between’ zones of human 
knowledge, conventionally labelled ‘culture’ and ‘nature’, for four 
decades. McCarthy’s scatological work, ranging from his 1970s 
sexually explicit performances, in which he stuffed raw meat into 
his mouth and filled his underwear with ketchup and butter, such as 
in his 1974 Hot Dog where he shaved his body, placed his penis into a 
hotdog bun, bound gauze around his head while retching and vomiting, 
to the more recent sculptural work like 2009 White Snow in which the 
seven dwarves are depicted as sexually grotesque creatures, with 
flaccid dangling phallus-like noses, erect penises, and disfigured 
bodies, or, indeed, caricatures of George W. Bush mechanically 
sodomising pigs, and the 2013 Complex Pile –  huge inflatable 
excrement dropped on Hong Kong. All these works very obviously 
desecrate culturally sanctified systems of knowledge production.
Joe Davis, on the other hand, a decade-long collaborator of the 
MIT Lab and the Harvard Medical Lab, creates projects with the 
DNA programming languages in which poetic texts and graphics are 
inserted into living organisms; projects that transmit the gene for the 
most abundant protein on Earth to three sun-like stars, such as his 
2009 Rubisco Stars; or works in which silkworms are genetically 
modified to produce transgenic silks biomineralised with metallic 
gold. Having designed such gadgets as the Bacterial Radio for which 
he received Ars Electronica’s Golden Nica in 2012, Davis’s work 
also investigates the genetics of serendipity in mice using mouse 
-driven mechanical dice-throwing apparata. Many of Davis’s works 
are meticulously documented; alongside a scientific exposé, they 
comprise a methodological account, as can be seen from his most 
recent paper that describes a symbiotic-like, biologically driven 
regenerating fabric, co-published with a number of scientists under 
the eponymous title in Scientific Reports in 2017. Offering a clear and 
much-needed methodological account of bacterial strains and growth 
conditions, fabrics, microscopy, image and bioinformatic analysis, 
gene design, and the various tearing experiments, the article is a 
point of entry into what would, without an explanation, seem like 
pure magic. 
For all its un-mediated-ness, however, McCarthy’s work follows 
a clear medial development from performance to object-hood, 
characteristic of what has, since the 1960s, been referred to as 
contemporary art. It also operates in a clearly defined symbolic arena, 
identified by anthropologists, such as Mary Douglas (2002), as a 
site where ‘ideas about separation […] demarcating and punishing 
transgressions have as their main function to impose a system on an 
inherently untidy experience’ and where ‘it is only by exaggerating 
the difference between within and without […] with and against, 
that a semblance or order is created’ (2002, p. 4). Despite the fact 
that McCarthy himself offers no more than anecdotal accounts of his 
work, alongside an occasional correction of the persisting, but, in fact, 
ungrounded comparison with the Viennese Actionists, and despite the 
fact that he works very much within the ‘research through art’ idiom, 
his work, viewed in continuity over four decades, is transparent and 
accessible. It also has recognised epistemic value.3
Davis’s work, on the other hand, retains a touch of the inexplicable 
and the profoundly mysterious despite the manifold and thorough 
explanations. The epistemic surplus here remains unsubsumable 
under any discursive strategy, cross- or post-disciplinary exegesis. 
The work is always more, much more than its rationale, exegesis, or 
appendices. And yet, this ‘more’ can be neither qualified nor quantified. 
When compared, McCarthy and Davis’s approaches, either to a single 
work, or to their entire oeuvre, remain irreducible to the ‘through’ and 
1.  For a more in-depth discussion of the specifically Dutch brand of Calvinist transparency see Lushetich (2014a). 
2.  For a comprehensive discussion of Fluxshops and Mail Order Centers see Lushetich, N. (2014b). 
3.  For more information, see Jones (2000) and Ruggoff, (1996).
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‘for’ paradigm of artistic research. Undecidably, they both collapse 
and uphold the hierarchies (as well as the practices) of knowledge.
Why Knowledge Can no Longer  
be Undecidable      
In the current historical moment, however, stating that knowledge is, 
ultimately, undecidable – which it certainly is – is both utopistic and 
problematic. In cognitive capitalism, which works at ‘capturing, within a 
generalized social activity, the innovative elements that produce value’ 
(Negri and Vercellone 2008, p. 44), there is an increasing pressure on 
artists to discursivise their work in keeping with the ratified epistemic 
methodologies, with only a small margin for variation – the occasional 
insertion of a ‘poetic’ voice into a prevalently discursive style, for 
example. This pressure is the pressure of value extraction, part of the 
vertiginous process of epistemic commodification, related to two sets 
of problems. The first set comprises the commonplaces of capitalism: 
the fetishisation of the mode of production, accumulation, and, more 
recently, the extraction of value via the rhetoric of excellence, and 
netocratic quantification. The second is far more serious. It concerns 
the generative power of the above processes as related to the additive 
nature of the digital media, the irrationality of rationality, and the 
growing attention deficit. 
Let me begin with the first set first. The fetishisation of 
methodology – as a smoothly operating epistemic mode of production 
– was debunked decades ago by such figures as Jacques Derrida, 
Bruno Latour, and Steve Woolgar. Discussing Plato’s Phaedrus in 
‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ and referring to Plato’s ruminations on Socrates’s 
uncertainty about the merits of writing, Derrida (1981) shows that 
Socrates, widely considered as the founder of Western philosophy, 
debates the merits of writing in relation to mythology, not to philosophy. 
What is presented as a rational argument is shown to be dependent 
on myth – the realm of fables, not logical reasoning (1981, p. 125-
127). In similar fashion, in Laboratory Life, Bruno Latour and Steve 
Woolgar (1979) show that the practice of science ‘widely regarded 
by outsiders as well organized, logical and coherent, in fact consists 
of a disordered array of observations with which scientists struggle 
to produce order’ (1979, p. 36). Laboratory life is here shown to be a 
chaotic mixture of social, political, and technical factors, the divide 
between which is instituted a posteriori, in the form of scientific 
writing. In this day and age, the pitfalls of methodological fetishisation 
are, in most papers and doctoral dissertations, acknowledged by way 
of the obligatory rumination on the limits of the methodology/ies used, 
after which one often proceeds with the very same methodology/
ies. This impasse harkens back to the performative – inaugurative 
and ordering – function of the authorial address. More importantly, 
it points to the transcendental existence of the idea of methodology 
as an epistemic performative, regardless of the efficacy of any 
particular methodology. Such a transcendental existence and efficacy 
of an ordering method is coexistent with the transcendental nature 
of capitalism, which operates with any set of values – European, 
American, Asian, regulated, deviant – as well as with any other. 
Key to the mercuriality of capitalism is, of course, knowledge as 
a productive force that creates new forms of accumulation. Suffice 
it to think of the extent to which the culture of sharing and free 
software has helped Apple and Microsoft to sell more hardware. Or, the 
extent to which the widespread interpellation to creativity has made 
it possible for universities to operate in a debt economy. In cognitive 
capitalism, the rise of the culture of sharing is concomitant with 
financial precariousness. Likewise, the rise of the knowledge society 
is concomitant with the degradation of artists and intellectuals whose 
work is quantified according to the most reductionist economic criteria 
– economic criteria being, according to André Gorz (1989) by definition 
reductionist, since economics arose as a form of emancipation from 
the corruption of religious institutions in the nineteenth century but 
retained the exact same dogmatic organising principle, divided into 
three economic ‘wholes’ that mimic the trinity of the Father, the 
Son, and the Holy Ghost: the production, the reproduction, and the 
distribution of wealth (1989, p. 112). The knowledge of the artist and 
the intellectual is, in the twenty-first century, small-changed into 
minuscule areas of expertise, much like the assembly line worker’s 
actions were, in industrial capitalism and with the aid of Taylorism, 
reduced to a limited number of mindlessly repetitive actions. This 
‘optimisation’ of knowledge production, which goes hand in hand 
with the ‘scientisation’ of life, and its removal from ‘the reach of 
participatory politics’ has, as Ashis Nandy (2000) has argued, made 
educational institutions into the ‘depositories of expertise’ whose 
purpose is to ‘legitimize the ‘expertization’ of public affairs and the 
reign of the professionals’ (2000, p. 116). The rise of the ‘experts’ 
and the ‘professionals’ cannot be separated from the extraction of 
value via the misplaced rhetoric of excellence. Reaching reasonable 
expectations is no longer enough in any sphere of life. Only exceeding all 
performance parameters and achieving so-called outstanding results is 
a guarantee of what is portrayed as a sustainable knowledge economy.
The Misplaced Rhetoric of Excellence
Excellence – the Greek arête, which refers to attaining one’s own 
personal pinnacle – is, without a doubt, a laudable concept that has 
exercised the minds of many philosophers, from Aristotle and Plato, to 
Baruch Spinoza and Friedrich Nietzsche. In Homeric poetry, the term 
was associated with bravery, passion, and personal effectiveness. In 
Aristotle and Plato, arête was allied with knowledge, contemplation, 
and meta-knowledge. In cognitive capitalism, however, which relies 
on obsessive ranking and perpetual judgment, excellence bears far 
more semblance to the Weberian equation of the spirit of capitalism 
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with the Protestant work ethic, than to bravery, passion, knowledge, or 
contemplation. In Max Weber’s ([1930] 1992) famous paradigm, laid 
out in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, the Protestant 
work ethic – answering the call of ‘duty’ – is paired with virtue, as 
is, indeed, goal-orientated action, and the resulting goal-orientated 
knowledge production. Virtue is, in turn, inseparable from success, and 
success is inseparable from the amassment of material attributes that 
are both quantifiable and cumulative. By tirelessly displaying the fruits 
of his/her labour in the form of accumulated worldly possessions, the 
early capitalist, like the Protestant believer, sought to display, and, 
in this way, authenticate predilection – the status of being chosen 
by her god. At the same time, however, the coveted status of divine 
predilection manifested in no other way but through the accumulation 
of worldly possessions. 
Bearing this particular tautology in mind, it comes as little surprise 
that, in cognitive capitalism, epistemic ratification continues in the 
‘authenticating’ tradition. Suffice it to look at the questions put to artists 
taking part in the UK REF [Research Excellence Framework] impact 
studies (studies that valorise practical artistic projects on the basis 
of their impact on their environment, other artists, scholars, and the 
general public). They take the following form: ‘how many people have 
you influenced? Please provide evidence in the form of testimonials 
and/or metrics’. The fact that many of the most influential artists of all 
times, Franz Kafka or Vincent Van Gogh, for instance, died in obscurity, 
does not, according to the current hegemonic paradigm, reflect the 
obvious fact that they were probably more interested in their work 
rather than in authenticating their predilection as ‘knowledgeable 
literary or painterly experts’, although, clearly, neither Kafka nor van 
Gogh were forced to account for their productivity through metric 
measurements. But before we relegate this problem to the movement 
of big data, programmed to detect pattern and similarity in order 
to accelerate cumulative, supposedly value-accruing processes, it 
is worth pondering the early manifestation of the problem, not for 
historical reasons, but in order to identify possible alternatives.
In his early writing on simulacra, in which he presciently terms 
the social ‘a total construct […] constructing its hyperreality from 
statistics, polls, computer models’, and turning individuals into ‘data’ 
(2001, p. 22), Jean Baudrillard establishes an important correlation 
between the rise of industrial capitalism, petit bourgeoisie, and modes 
of communication. Despite the fact that his emphasis on simulacra is 
of limited relevance here, the self-enunciatory, performative working 
of the sign is crucially important when read against the Weberian 
authentication, and the increasingly problematic relationship of 
knowledge to information. For Baudrillard, hyperreality comes into 
being through four phases of the image. In the first phase, the image 
reflects a profound reality; in the second, the image masks this profound 
reality; in the third, the image masks the absence of a profound reality; 
in the fourth (the digital phase) the image no longer bears any relation 
to reality whatsoever (1994, p. 2-6). While the passage from the 
first to the second phase is arguably emancipatory, it also creates a 
problematic relation of emancipatory gestures to their performative 
working – which inaugurate as existing that which they suggest. 
In the first phase of the image, which belongs to the pre-industrial 
period, signs correspond to the factual state of affairs. A blacksmith’s 
professional activity corresponds to the sign outside their shop – a 
hammer and a chisel. The way people dress corresponds to what is 
thought to be their ‘station’ in life; peasants dress like peasants, nobility 
dress like nobility. In the second phase, the phase of industrialisation, 
characterised by the rapid development of new modes of production, 
increasingly detached from (what were formerly seen as) ‘natural’ 
processes, the bourgeoisie and industrial entrepreneurs mark their 
appurtenance to this class via the ostentatious possession of objects. 
Their behaviour does not reflect an existing reality. On the contrary, 
it creates a new reality through speech, performance, and the use of 
symbols. Regardless of their ‘station’ at birth, the self-inaugurated 
bourgeoisie asserts independence in the face of ‘old’ norms and 
values: the family lineage, upbringing, schooling, and taste. Precisely 
the same occurs with the upwardly mobile professionals of the 
1980s – yuppies – who, mimicking inaugurative gestures, create 
yet another ‘emancipatory’ sign system where values such as in-depth 
knowledge of a field acquired through years of study, are replaced 
with effectiveness, social connected-ness, the general transferability 
of values, and pure net weight. A similar performative inauguration 
of status, via the ostentatious amassment of worldly goods that 
continues in the Weberian vein can be seen in the latest variation on 
the bourgeois/entrepreneurs/yuppies theme: the netocrats, whose 
rise to prominence is concomitant with the rise of the ‘experts’, and 
the burgeoning of the knowledge economy.
Netocratic Quantification 
Alexander Bard and Jan Söderqvist’s (2002) Netocracy establishes an 
important relation between the arbitrary production of value (via value-
accruing networks), and digital quantification, despite the authors’ 
problematic use of an active-passive polarity, which portrays the 
consumtariat as non-productive, and fails to take into account that 
consumers have long become prosumers. However, the value of the 
book lies in Bard and Söderqvist’s lucid explanation of the way in 
which the netocrats, who create value from pure connected-ness 
and connectivity (the social and digital conditions necessary for 
the channeling of information) also create hegemony by imposing 
on knowledge production the reductionist relation of ostentatious 
possessions to success. The chief problem here is that, in order to be 
distributable via the digital networks, knowledge has to be smooth, 
homogeneous, and easily consumable.  It has to be reduced, at least 
in part, to information, which brings us to the second, and much more 
serious set of problems. 
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One may well ask: what is knowledge – in the strong sense of 
the word – if not a heterogeneous, deeply transformative, temporally 
intense force that comes into being at the interstice of the past, the 
present, and the future? (Han 2016, p. 17). As Byung-Chul Han has 
argued, knowledge differs greatly from the homogeneity of additivity, 
characteristic of information, which does not require a complex 
process of transformation to take place, and can, for this reason, 
be easily recorded, reproduced, and distributed; why it travels much 
faster than knowledge (p. 17). The problem of the accelerated, smooth, 
and unhindered passage of knowledge-cum-information, where the 
emphasis is on distribution, speed, and ‘innovative’ value-creation, 
is, in many ways, similar to the well-known irrationality of rationality, 
analysed by George Ritzer a quarter of a century ago in his 1993 book 
The McDonaldization of Society. 
Focusing on the fast food industry, but, as the title suggests, 
implying society at large, Ritzer articulates a particular brand of 
irrational rationality – a mode of calculation that replaces thinking 
with a series of means-to-an-end, cost-benefit analyses, whose 
sole parameters are efficiency, predictability, accelerated value 
production, and, ultimately, control. In Ritzer’s analysis, McDonald’s 
not only managed to sell nutritionally noxious food at a great profit, far 
more worryingly, it managed to exercise social control by substituting 
systematic, self-serving irrationality for rationality. The same 
principle is evident in the various forms of knowledge quantification, 
ranking, hegemonically imposed as a necessity amidst the tireless 
semiocapitalist sign re-combination that exhausts ‘mental capacities 
through information deluge and acceleration’ (Berardi, 2015, p. 68). 
What we are left with is the reduction of knowledge to a performative 
function. In cognitive capitalism, one of the foremost, although not sole 
purposes of knowledge production is to maintain the transcendental 
idea of knowledge – as a productive force – while ensuring that 
particular epistemic products conform to the easy presentation in 
the media, and accelerated consumption. Infelicitously, accelerated 
consumption is increasingly accompanied by diminished attention, 
which, in turn, necessitates the production of increasingly simpler bytes 
to be digested with less and less effort. Information Fatigue syndrome, 
first reported by David Lewis in 1996, initially affected individuals 
working with huge quantities of information. Today, IFS affects 
everyone due to the vertiginous growth of the informational mass. One 
of its key symptoms is the numbing of analytical capacities. As Han 
(2015) suggests in In the Swarm, arguing against digital smoothness, 
borne of over-positivity and a lack of negativity that manifests as 
additivity and accelerated growth: ‘[b]eyond a certain threshold, 
information no longer informs, it deforms’ (2015, p. 82). Thinking, 
by contrast, as a form of knowledge production and reception, hinges 
on ‘distinction and selection’ since ‘[t]hought is always exclusive’ 
(p. 82). Thought cannot be additive or cumulative precisely because 
it is transformative, because it is internally different, and changes 
the hitherto existing state of affairs in every phase of the process.
At the root of the increasingly palpable epistemic violence is 
the reduction of knowledge to information, and of information to 
excessive, yet deformed accumulation. Diffuse but nevertheless 
efficacious, this form of violence operates through several recognisible 
micro-strategies. The first is epistemic degradation via the withholding 
of legitimation in case of non-compliance with meaningless 
quantification (the inability to answer the ‘how many’ and ‘how 
much’ questions ‘satisfactorily’). The second is expertisation in areas 
where an overview is needed; for example, outsourcing evaluations 
of educational institutions to market research specialists, and 
subsequently treating the specialists’ McDonaldised reports, which, by 
definition, cannot not be McDonaldised due to the methodology they 
use, as serious data. The third is the universalisation – or reduction to 
the common denominator – of knowledges that require a particular 
species of time, a particular brand of concentration, and a specific 
sensorial engagement, and turning them into ‘transferable’ skills, 
the general equivalent of any specific skill, imitative of the general 
equivalent of all (exchange) value, which is money. The fourth is the 
game-theory notion of achieving results by other means, for example, 
by frantic networking and elaborate advertising in order to produce 
quantified ‘value’ and, in this way, legitimate mediocre projects. 
In the current knowledge economy, artistic knowledge is called 
upon to solve the accumulated problems of capitalism, such as the 
climate disaster euphemistically termed ‘climate change’. At the 
same time, however, artistic knowledge production is increasingly 
regimented, as well as subsumed under the quasi-emancipatory, but, in 
reality, McDonaldised ‘accessibility’ paradigm. It is often also violently 
squeezed into incompatible formats and media, despite the fact that 
there have also been positive developments in this sphere, such as the 
sound and the video essay, which has replaced the obligatory written 
essay. While it goes without saying that there can be no recipe for 
artistic knowledge production, and/or research, it is worth bearing in 
mind the Weberian relation of accumulation to authentication, perfected 
by generation upon generation of the petit bourgeoisie, entrepreneurs, 
yuppies, and netocrats. In the digital age, the relation of accumulation 
to authentication has acquired speed and alarming performance 
efficacy – the ability to inaugurate, and, if fact, institute that which 
is suggested as reality. The problem here, as already mentioned, is 
not ‘real value’ versus the simulacrum, but the cumulative working of 
performatively (far too) efficacious gestures, that breed results very 
different from (any definition of) knowledge: the inability to grasp non-
reductionist premises, disinterest, attention deficit, and ignorance. 
Idiosyncrasy as Strategy
What is needed is a decidedly non-homeopathic approach: idiosyncrasy, 
obscurity, even incomprehensibility. Not as a weak ‘I would rather 
not’ strategy – to borrow from Herman Melville’s over-exploited, half-
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dead anti-hero Bartleby, depicted in his 1853 short story Bartleby 
the Scrivener – but as an active antidote to rampant, somatically 
painful reductionism. An antidote that can re-invigorate perception, 
rumination, and inspiration by creating indigestible otherness that 
thwarts and blocks the smoothness of communication, not in the 
form of an inaugurative gesture – avant-garde manifesto-style – but 
as a quiet illumination: a persistent, wholehearted, intimate effort in 
a chosen direction, which has nothing to do with individualism, but 
with the basic nature of any worthwhile knowledge: irreducibility. As 
Tengo Kawana, a character from Haruki Murakami’s 1Q84 repeates 
throughout the novel: ‘If you can’t understand it without an explanation, 
you can’t understand it with an explanation’ (Murakami, 2012). 
On a less anecdotal note, and pointing to the fact that any type of 
outsider – for instance, the idiot – has long vanished from society, Han 
argues that digital networking and communication ‘have massively 
amplified the compulsion to conform’ (Han 2017, p. 82). Etymologically, 
‘idiosyncrasy’ refers to a specific mixture of bodily humours as well as 
to a person’s particular perception of the world, based on this specific 
mixture of humours. Because of its grounded-ness in irreducible 
bodily specificity, idiosyncrasy presents an obstacle to accelerated, 
compulsive, coercive communication and the incessant, smooth relaying 
of information. In the age of increasing epistemic violence, borne of 
cognitive-capitalist commodification, idiotism amounts to the practice 
of freedom, as the idiot is ‘by nature […] unallied, un-networked and 
uninformed’ (p. 83). Given that ‘heresy’ means ‘choice’, and thus the 
courage to deviate from orthodoxy, the idiot is, in fact, the contemporary 
heretic (p. 84).  Unlike intelligence, which refers to a confined choice (inter-
legere means to read between), and, for this reason, remains dependent 
on the system within which it operates, the idiosyncratic, un-allied, 
uncommunicative approach to knowledge, may, indeed, be the only way 
out of the enclosure created by the commodification of epistemic value.
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